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INNOVATION AND COMPETITION POLICY: 
CASES AND MATERIALS 
Herbert Hovenkamp 
 
CHAPTER 3 
HARM TO COMPETITION OR INNOVATION (2D ED); 
REMEDIES 
 
BRUNSWICK CORP. v. PUEBLO BOWL-O-MAT, INC. 
429 U.S. 477 (1977) 
 
Mr. Justice MARSHALL delivered the opinion of the Court. 
 
This case raises important questions concerning the interrelationship of 
the antimerger and private damages action provisions of the Clayton 
Antitrust Act. 
 
Petitioner is one of the two largest manufacturers of bowling equipment 
in the United States. Respondents are three of the 10 bowling centers owned 
by Treadway Companies, Inc. Since 1965, petitioner has acquired and 
operated a large number of bowling centers, including six in the markets in 
which respondents operate. Respondents instituted this action contending 
that these acquisitions violated various provisions of the antitrust laws. In 
the late 1950's, the bowling industry expanded rapidly, and petitioner's sales 
of lanes, automatic pinsetters, and ancillary equipment rose accordingly. 
Since this equipment requires a major capital expenditure $12,600 for each 
lane and pinsetter, most of petitioner's sales were for secured credit. 
 
In the early 1960's, the bowling industry went into a sharp decline. 
Petitioner's sales quickly dropped to preboom levels. Moreover, petitioner 
experienced great difficulty in collecting money owed it; by the end of 1964 
over $100,000,000, or more than 25%, of petitioner's accounts were more 
than 90 days delinquent.  Repossessions rose dramatically, but attempts to 
sell or lease the repossessed equipment met with only limited success.
 
 
Because petitioner had borrowed close to $250,000,000 to finance its credit 
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sales, it was, as the Court of Appeals concluded, “in serious financial 
difficulty.”  
 
To meet this difficulty, petitioner began acquiring and operating 
defaulting bowling centers when their equipment could not be resold and a 
positive cash flow could be expected from operating the centers. During the 
seven years preceding the trial in this case, petitioner acquired 222 centers, 
54 of which it either disposed of or closed.  These acquisitions made 
petitioner by far the largest operator of bowling centers, with over five 
times as many centers as its next largest competitor.  Petitioner's net worth 
in 1965 was more than eight times greater, and its gross revenue more than 
seven times greater, than the total for the 11 next largest bowling chains.  
Nevertheless, petitioner controlled only 2% of the bowling centers in the 
United States. 
 
At issue here are acquisitions by petitioner in the three markets in which 
respondents are located: Pueblo, Colo., Poughkeepsie, N. Y., and Paramus, 
N. J. In 1965, petitioner acquired one defaulting center in Pueblo, one in 
Poughkeepsie, and two in the Paramus area. In 1969, petitioner acquired a 
third defaulting center in the Paramus market, and in 1970 petitioner 
acquired a fourth. Petitioner closed its Poughkeepsie center in 1969 after 
three years of unsuccessful operation; the Paramus center acquired in 1970 
also proved unsuccessful, and in March 1973 petitioner gave notice that it 
would cease operating the center when its lease expired. The other four 
centers were operational at the time of trial. 
 
Respondents initiated this action in June 1966, alleging, inter alia, that 
these acquisitions might substantially lessen competition or tend to create a 
monopoly in violation of § 7 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. §18.
 
 
Respondents sought damages, pursuant to s 4 of the Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15, for 
three times “the reasonably expectable profits to be made (by respondents) 
from the operation of their bowling centers.” App. A24. Respondents also 
sought a divestiture order, an injunction against future acquisitions, and 
such “other further and different relief” as might be appropriate under s 16 
of the Act, 15 U.S.C.  § 26. 
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The Court of Appeals, while endorsing the legal theories upon which 
respondents' claim was based, reversed the judgment and remanded the case 
for further proceedings. The court found that a properly instructed jury 
could have concluded that petitioner was a “giant” whose entry into a 
“market of pygmies” might lessen horizontal retail competition, because 
such a “giant” “has greater ease of entry into the market, can accomplish 
cost-savings by investing in new equipment, can resort to low or below cost 
sales to sustain itself against competition for a longer period, and can obtain 
more favorable credit terms.”  
 
The court also found that there was sufficient evidence to permit a jury 
to conclude that but for petitioner's actions, the acquired centers would have 
gone out of businessAnd the court held that if a jury were to make such 
findings, respondents would be entitled to damages for threefold the income 
they would have earned. After reviewing the instructions on these issues, 
however, the court decided that the jury had not been properly charged and 
that therefore a new trial was required. It also decided that since “an 
essential predicate” for the District Court's grant of equitable relief was the 
jury verdict on the s 7 claim, the equitable decree should be vacated as well. 
And it concluded that in any event equitable relief “should be restricted to 
preventing those practices by which a deep pocket market entrant harms 
competition. . . . (D)ivestiture was simply inappropriate.” 
 
The issue for decision is a narrow one. Petitioner does not presently 
contest the Court of Appeals' conclusion that a properly instructed jury 
could have found the acquisitions unlawful. Nor does petitioner challenge 
the Court of Appeals' determination that the evidence would support a 
finding that had petitioner not acquired these centers, they would have gone 
out of business and respondents' income would have increased. Petitioner 
questions only whether antitrust damages are available where the sole injury 
alleged is that competitors were continued in business, thereby denying 
respondents an anticipated increase in market shares. 
 
To answer that question it is necessary to examine the antimerger and 
treble-damages provisions of the Clayton Act. Section 7 of the Act 
proscribes mergers whose effect “may be substantially to lessen 
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competition, or to tend to create a monopoly.” (Emphasis added.) It is, as 
we have observed many times, a prophylactic measure, intended “primarily 
to arrest apprehended consequences of intercorporate relationships before 
those relationships could work their evil . . . .”  
 
Section 4, in contrast, is in essence a remedial provision. It provides 
treble damages to “(a)ny person who shall be injured in his business or 
property by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws . . . .” Of 
course, treble damages also play an important role in penalizing wrongdoers 
and deterring wrongdoing, as we also have frequently observed.  It 
nevertheless is true that the treble-damages provision, which makes awards 
available only to injured parties, and measures the awards by a multiple of 
the injury actually proved, is designed primarily as a remedy. 
 
Intermeshing a statutory prohibition against acts that have a potential to 
cause certain harms with a damages action intended to remedy those harms 
is not without difficulty. Plainly, to recover damages respondents must 
prove more than that petitioner violated §7, since such proof establishes 
only that injury may result. Respondents contend that the only additional 
element they need demonstrate is that they are in a worse position than they 
would have been had petitioner not committed those acts. The Court of 
Appeals agreed, holding compensable any loss “causally linked” to “the 
mere presence of the violator in the market.”  Because this holding divorces 
antitrust recovery from the purposes of the antitrust laws without a clear 
statutory command to do so, we cannot agree with it. 
 
Every merger of two existing entities into one, whether lawful or 
unlawful, has the potential for producing economic readjustments that 
adversely affect some persons. But Congress has not condemned mergers 
on that account; it has condemned them only when they may produce 
anticompetitive effects. Yet under the Court of Appeals' holding, once a 
merger is found to violate §7, all dislocations caused by the merger are 
actionable, regardless of whether those dislocations have anything to do 
with the reason the merger was condemned. This holding would make s 4 
recovery entirely fortuitous, and would authorize damages for losses which 
are of no concern to the antitrust laws. 
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Both of these consequences are well illustrated by the facts of this case. 
If the acquisitions here were unlawful, it is because they brought a “deep 
pocket” parent into a market of “pygmies.” Yet respondents' injury the loss 
of income that would have accrued had the acquired centers gone bankrupt 
bears no relationship to the size of either the acquiring company or its 
competitors. Respondents would have suffered the identical “loss” but no 
compensable injury had the acquired centers instead obtained refinancing or 
been purchased by “shallow pocket” parents as the Court of Appeals itself 
acknowledged,
 
 Thus, respondents' injury was not of “the type that the 
statute was intended to forestall.”… 
 
But the antitrust laws are not merely indifferent to the injury claimed 
here. At base, respondents complain that by acquiring the failing centers 
petitioner preserved competition, thereby depriving respondents of the 
benefits of increased concentration. The damages respondents obtained are 
designed to provide them with the profits they would have realized had 
competition been reduced. The antitrust laws, however, were enacted for 
“the protection of competition not competitors,” Brown Shoe Co. v. United 
States, 370 U.S., at 320. It is inimical to the purposes of these laws to award 
damages for the type of injury claimed here. 
 
Of course, Congress is free, if it desires, to mandate damages awards for 
all dislocations caused by unlawful mergers despite the peculiar 
consequences of so doing. But because of these consequences, “we should 
insist upon a clear expression of a congressional purpose,” before 
attributing such an intent to Congress. We can find no such expression in 
either the language or the legislative history of §4. To the contrary, it is far 
from clear that the loss of windfall profits that would have accrued had the 
acquired centers failed even constitutes “injury” within the meaning of § 4. 
And it is quite clear that if respondents were injured, it was not “by reason 
of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws”: while respondents' loss 
occurred “by reason of” the unlawful acquisitions, it did not occur “by 
reason of” that which made the acquisitions unlawful. 
 
We therefore hold that the plaintiffs to recover treble damages on 
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account of § 7 violations, they must prove more than injury causally linked 
to an illegal presence in the market. Plaintiffs must prove antitrust injury, 
which is to say injury of the type the antitrust laws were intended to prevent 
and that flows from that which makes defendants' acts unlawful. The injury 
should reflect the anticompetitive effect either of the violation or of 
anticompetitive acts made possible by the violation. It should, in short, be 
“the type of loss that the claimed violations . . . would be likely to cause.” 
Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, 395 U.S., at 125. 
 
We come, then, to the question of appropriate disposition of this case. 
At the very least, petitioner is entitled to a new trial, not only because of the 
instructional errors noted by the Court of Appeals that are not at issue here, 
see n. 6, supra, but also because the District Court's instruction as to the 
basis for damages was inconsistent with our holding as outlined above. Our 
review of the record, however, persuades us that a new trial on the damages 
claim is unwarranted. Respondents based their case solely on their novel 
damages theory which we have rejected. While they produced some 
conclusory testimony suggesting that in operating the acquired centers 
petitioner had abused its deep pocket by engaging in anticompetitive 
conduct, they made no attempt to prove that they had lost any income as a 
result of such predation.
 
 Rather, their entire proof of damages was based on 
their claim to profits that would have been earned had the acquired centers 
closed. Since respondents did not prove any cognizable damages and have 
not offered any justification for allowing respondents, after two trials and 
over 10 years of litigation, yet a third opportunity to do so, it follows that, 
petitioner is entitled, in accord with its motion made pursuant to Rule 50(b), 
to judgment on the damages claim notwithstanding the verdict. 
 
NOTES AND QUESTIONS 
 
1.  The “antitrust injury” doctrine developed in Brunswick is not about 
causation or injury in fact.  Clearly the merger that the plaintiff was 
challenging caused it to suffer harm.  The problem was the kind of harm.  
The plaintiff was complaining about more competition rather than less, and 
it would be inimicable to the purpose of antitrust law to use it to restrain 
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rather than promote competition.  Nevertheless, several courts have read 
Brunswick to require little more than harm and causation. 
2.  One great value of the antitrust injury requirement is that it enables 
courts to assess complaints without discovery, simply by looking at the 
theory of injury.  For example, just by looking at the plaintiff’s complaint in 
Brunswick one can ascertain that the complaint is about increased 
competition rather than less. 
3.  In Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colo., Inc., 479 U.S. 104 (1986), the 
Supreme Court held that the antitrust injury doctrine also applied to requests 
for an injunction. The lower courts had enjoined the merger of two 
competitors on the usual ground that it increased concentration and thus 
made future oligopoly pricing more likely. The Supreme Court ruled that 
the plaintiff, a competitor, was not entitled to the injunction based on its 
complaint that after the merger the firm would charge lower but 
nonpredatory prices.  Mergers are ordinarily condemned when the fear is 
higher prices.  Comparing §4 of the Clayton Act, which authorizes 
damages, and §16, which authorizes injunctions at the behest of private 
plaintiffs, the Court said: 
The wording concerning the relationship of the injury to the 
violation of the antitrust laws in each section is comparable. Section 4 
requires proof of injury “by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust 
laws”; §16 requires proof of “threatened loss or damage by a violation 
of the antitrust laws.” It would be anomalous, we think, to read the 
Clayton Act to authorize a private plaintiff to secure an injunction 
against a threatened injury for which he would not be entitled to 
compensation if the injury actually occurred. 
 
ANDREAS V. VOLKSWAGEN OF AMERICA, INC. 
336 F.3d 789 (8
th
 Cir. 2003) 
 
HANSEN, Circuit Judge. 
 
Brian Andreas, an artist and author from Decorah, Iowa, created a 
drawing in 1994 entitled “Angels of Mercy,” which he paired with the 
accompanying text he authored: “Most people don't know that there are 
angels whose only job is to make sure you don't get too comfortable & fall 
asleep & miss your life.” The work was copyrighted and copies of it were 
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included in numerous books. Prints of the work have been sold throughout 
the United States. 
 
M & S created three television commercials to promote Audi's initial 
release of the Audi TT coupe into the United States market. One of the 
television commercials, referred to as the “Wake Up” commercial, depicted 
an Audi TT coupe in a garden surrounded by angelic looking, neoclassical 
statues. The commercial contained a voice-over, which says in its entirety: 
“I think I just had a wake-up call, and it was disguised as a car, and it was 
screaming at me not to get too comfortable and fall asleep and miss my 
life.” The commercial aired from May through October 1999, when Audi 
pulled the commercial after the allegation of copyright infringement were 
brought to its attention. 
Andreas brought a copyright infringement action against M & S and 
Audi…. 
 
The district court granted Audi's motion for JAML and vacated the jury's 
$570,000 award representing Audi's profits generated by the 
illegal copyright infringement. The court found that the award was too 
speculative because Andreas failed to prove a causal connection between 
the infringement and Audi's profits from the TT coupe. The award equaled 
10% of Audi's after-tax profits on the TT coupe sales during the time the 
commercial aired. … 
 
The Copyright Act provides that a copyright holder is entitled to recover 
his actual damages as well as “any profits of the infringer that are 
attributable to the infringement and are not taken into account in computing 
actual damages.” 17 U.S.C. § 504(b) (2000). The infringer's profits are 
awarded to the copyright holder “to prevent the infringer from unfairly 
benefiting from a wrongful act.”   “In establishing the infringer's profits, the 
copyright owner is required to present proof only of the infringer's gross 
revenue, and the infringer is required to prove his or her deductible 
expenses and the elements of profit attributable to factors other than the 
copyrighted work.” § 504(b). “[W]here some of the defendant's profits 
result from the infringement and other profits are caused by different 
factors, ... the burden of proof is on the defendant ... [to] prove not only ‘his 
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or her deductible expenses' but also ‘the element of the profit attributable to 
factors other than the copyrighted work.’ ” H.R.Rep. No. 94–1476, § 504, at 
161 (quoting § 504(b)). “Any doubt as to the computation of costs or profits 
is to be resolved in favor of the plaintiff…. 
 
Audi does not dispute the jury's finding of copyright infringement, but 
argues only that Andreas failed to establish a causal connection between the 
infringement and its gross revenues from the sale of the TT coupe. The 
district court noted that generally “a rebuttable presumption that the 
defendant's revenues are entirely attributable to the infringement arises, and 
the burden then shifts to the defendant to demonstrate what portion of the 
profits are not traceable to the infringement.”  The court applied a less strict 
standard, however, because this case involves indirect profits as opposed to 
direct profits: the infringers did not sell the copyrighted work, but used the 
copyrighted work to sell another product, the TT coupe. The court found 
that Andreas's proffered evidence of a connection between the infringement 
and Audi's revenues from the sale of the TT coupe during the time the 
commercial aired was too speculative to support the jury's award. 
 
Although cases distinguish between direct and indirect profits, the statute 
does not…. We agree that in an indirect profits case the profits 
“attributable” to the infringement are more difficult to quantify. But that 
difficulty does not change the burden of proof established by the statute…. 
The burden of proving apportionment (i.e., the contribution to profits of 
elements other than the infringed property), is the defendant's. 
 
The district court here concluded that the uncertainties in the evidence 
went to whether Audi profited from the infringing commercial at all—for 
which Andreas carried the burden of proof-rather than the extent that it 
profited from the infringement—for which Audi carried the burden of 
proof—because Andreas failed to prove that the infringed words resulted in 
the sale of any TT coupe. (Order at 9 (“While most people believe that 
advertising contributes somehow to the sales of motor vehicles, it is not 
sufficient for a plaintiff to rely on such intuitive notions as proof of 
causation.”).) However, in ruling on a motion for JAML, the evidence is to 
be read to support the verdict if at all reasonable. Andreas introduced more 
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than mere speculation that the Wake Up commercial contributed to sales of 
the TT coupe. The infringement was the centerpiece of a commercial that 
essentially showed nothing but the TT coupe. The evidence established that 
Audi enthusiastically presented the commercial to its dealers as an 
important and integral part of its launch of the TT coupe into the U.S. 
market; sales of the TT coupe during the period that the commercial aired 
were above Audi's projections; the three commercials received high ratings 
on the Allison–Fischer surveys that rated consumer recall of the 
commercials; and Audi paid M & S a substantial bonus based on the 
success of the commercials. Reading this evidence in the light most 
favorable to the verdict, the commercial did more than merely “contribute[ ] 
somehow,” id., to sales of the TT coupe. 
 
 Audi argues that numerous unknown elements other than the 
commercial, let alone the infringing words contained in the commercial, 
contributed to sales of the TT coupe, and that therefore the award was based 
on speculation. We recognize that the offending commercial probably did 
not contribute to every purchase of a TT coupe during the relevant time 
period. Undoubtedly, some buyer somewhere bought a TT coupe without 
having seen the commercial despite Audi's extensive use of it. But we reject 
the notion that Andreas was required to put a TT buyer on the stand to 
testify that she bought the car because of the commercial in order to meet 
his burden of a causal connection. Once a nexus was shown as established 
above, Andreas was required under the statute only to establish Audi's gross 
revenue from the TT coupe. Audi then bore the burden of establishing that 
its profit was attributable to factors other than the infringing words: the 
other two commercials that did not contain the infringed words, other parts 
of the Wake Up commercial, customer loyalty, brand recognition, etc. “Any 
doubt as to the computation of costs or profits is to be resolved in favor of 
the plaintiff. If the infringing defendant does not meet its burden of proving 
costs, the gross figure stands as the defendant's profits.”   
 
 Having concluded that Andreas met his burden of establishing a nexus 
between the infringement and Audi's sale of TT coupes, we also believe that 
the jury's award was not overly speculative. The total profit upon which the 
jury based its award was limited to Audi's profit generated only by the sale 
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of the TT coupe, and only during the time that the “Wake Up” commercial 
aired. The evidence established that Audi sold 5,384 TT coupes in 1999, but 
that number was reduced to account for the 238 pre-ordered vehicles, 
leaving 5,146 TT coupe sales between May and the end of the year that 
were potentially related to the infringing commercial. Audi realized 
$153,700,000 gross revenue on the sale of the limited number of TT coupes 
and an after-tax profit of $5,700,000. The jury awarded Andreas $570,000, 
or 10% of that profit generated by the sale of the TT coupe during the time 
period that the commercial aired as the profit attributable to Audi's 
infringing use of Andreas's copyrighted work. Conversely, the jury 
impliedly found that 90% of Audi's profit was attributable to factors other 
than the infringement. As we have held, Audi bore the burden of 
establishing the portion of its profit attributable to factors other than the 
infringement. This evidence provides a nonspeculative basis for the jury's 
award, and it is precisely the jury's function as the factfinder to do so. See, 
e.g., Frank Music II, 886 F.2d at 1550 (affirming district court's factual 
finding that 2% of casino's gaming and hotel profits were attributable to 
promotional value of music revue)….. 
 
We recognize that it is difficult to establish the portion of profits 
attributable to an infringement in cases where the infringed material is used 
in an advertisement for another product, but Congress put the burden of 
establishing “elements of profit attributable to factors other than the 
copyright work” on the defendant. 
 
Conclusion 
We reverse the district court's grant of Audi's judgment as a matter of 
law and reinstate the jury's $570,000 award of profits. The district court's 
rulings are affirmed in all other respects. 
 
NOTES AND QUESTIONS 
 
1.  In a lawsuit for copyright infringement, harm is often determined not 
by how much the plaintiff actually suffered, as in common law, but 
rather by how much the defendant infringer gained.  While the plaintiff 
is allowed to recover for actual harm, most of the disputes revolve 
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around the plaintiff’s ability to recover for “any profits of the infringer 
that are attributable to the infringement and are not taken into account in 
computing actual damages.” 17 U.S.C. § 504(b). In the alternative to 
actual harm, sometimes the plaintiff is much better off due to the 
infringement.  Consider the facts of the Andreas case. Was the artist any 
worse off due to Audi’s use of “Angels of Mercy” in its commercials?  
Was Andreas himself actually harmed in any way? Do more people 
know of Andreas’ artwork because if Audi’s infringement? 
 
2. While the Copyright Act does not differentiate between different types 
of profits, the 9
th
 Circuit  did.  In Mackie, Jack Mackie, a popular artist 
in Seattle, sued the Seattle Symphony Orchestra for incorporating his 
artwork in a promotional campaign without seeking prior approval.  The 
Court defined direct profits as “those that are generated by selling an 
infringing product” and indirect profits as “the revenue that has a more 
attenuated nexus to the infringement.”  Mackie v. Reiser, 296 F.3d 909, 
914 (9
th
 Cir. 2002).  Despite the different classifications, the court held 
“a copyright holder must establish the existence of a causal link before 
indirect profits damages can be recovered.” Id. The Andreas court 
recognized the difficulty in quantifying such indirect profits.  Is there a 
justification in distinguishing between types of profits when the statute 
provides no such guidance?  Considering both direct and indirect profits 
are subject to the same criteria in establishing infringement and a 
remedy, does distinguishing them present any benefit to infringement 
cases? 
 
3. Section 504(b) of the Copyright Act provides that “In establishing the 
infringer's profits, the copyright owner is required to present proof only 
of the infringer's gross revenue, and the infringer is required to prove his 
or her deductible expenses and the elements of profit attributable to 
factors other than the copyrighted work.” 17 U.S.C.  504(b) (2010).  In 
other words, the plaintiff in an infringement case must prove (1) the 
profits of the alleged infringer, (2) the plaintiff’s expenses in developing 
the copyright, and (3) the amount of profits the alleged infringer 
obtained specifically due to the alleged infringement.  The court in 
Andreas recognizes the difficulty this may present for the plaintiff in an 
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indirect infringement case.  Nevertheless, the initial burden remains 
with the plaintiff. 
 
 Once the court has found infringement the burden shifts to 
the defendant to prove that either the revenue obtained was not a profit, 
or that the profits are attributable to factors other than those in the 
copyrighted work.  See Konor Enterprises, Inc. v. Eagle Publications, 
Inc., 878 F.2d 138, 140 (4
th
 Cir. 1989); Bouchat v. Baltimore Ravens 
Football Club, Inc. 346 F.3d 514, 520 (4
th
 Cir. 2003).  Since the 
copyright owner is entitled to recover only the profits that are 
attributable to the infringement, the defendant could conceivably 
prevent the copyright holder from recovering any reimbursement.  See 
Cream Records, Inc. v. Jos. Schlitz Brewing Co. 754 F.2d 826 (9
th
 Cir. 
1985).  How fair is this shift of burden?  Once infringement has been 
discovered, should the infringer be able to present his or her own case to 
avoid reimbursing the entitled owner?  Should there be an automatic 
remedy for plaintiffs who prove infringement, regardless of the 
magnitude of such? 
 
4. The Copyright Act also provides for “statutory” damages that a 
copyright holder may obtain without regard to either its own losses or 
the infringers profits.  These damages can run as high as $150,000 per 
instance of willful infringement.  17 U.S.C. § 504.  They can become 
debilitating when they are applied to secondary liability for passive 
infringement by firms such as YouTube, which often commit 
infringement when posters place infringing material on it.  See MICHAEL 
A. CARRIER, INNOVATION FOR THE 21
ST
 CENTURY: HARNESSING THE 
POWER OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND ANTITRUST LAW 148-161 
(2009). 
TY, INC. V. PUB. INT’L LTD. 
     292 F.3d 512 (7
th
 Cir. 2002) 
  
POSNER, Circuit Judge. 
 
Ty is the manufacturer of Beanie Babies. These well-known beanbag 
stuffed animals are copyrightable as “sculptural works,” 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 
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102(a)(5); Ty, Inc. v. GMA Accessories, Inc., 132 F.3d 1167, 1169 (7th 
Cir.1997) and are copyrighted by Ty, which brought this suit for copyright 
and trademark infringement against Publications International, Ltd. (PIL), 
publisher of a series of books, with titles such as For the Love of Beanie 
Babies and Beanie Babies Collector's Guide, that contain photographs of 
Beanie Babies. PIL concedes that photographs of Beanie Babies are 
derivative works, which, being copies of copyrighted works, can be 
produced only under license from Ty-and PIL has no license. PIL's defense 
to the charge of copyright infringement is the doctrine of fair use. On Ty's 
motion for summary judgment, the district court rejected the defense, 
granted the motion, and issued a permanent injunction against PIL's selling 
any of its Beanie Babies books. It also awarded Ty PIL's profits from the 
sale of those books, $1.36 million, plus more than $200,000 in prejudgment 
interest….. 
 
The defense of fair use, originally judge-made, now codified, plays 
an essential role in copyright law. Without it, any copying of copyrighted 
material would be a copyright infringement. A book reviewer could not 
quote from the book he was reviewing without a license from the publisher. 
Quite apart from the impairment of freedom of expression that would result 
from giving a copyright holder control over public criticism of his work, to 
deem such quotation an infringement would greatly reduce the credibility of 
book reviews, to the detriment of copyright owners as a group, though not 
to the owners of copyright on the worst books. Book reviews would no 
longer serve the reading public as a useful guide to which books to buy. 
Book reviews that quote from (“copy”) the books being reviewed increase 
the demand for copyrighted works; to deem such copying infringement 
would therefore be perverse, and so the fair-use doctrine permits such 
copying. Desnick v. American Broadcasting Companies, Inc., 44 F.3d 1345, 
1351 (7th Cir.1995)(dictum); William M. Landes, “Copyright, Borrowed 
Images, and Appropriation Art: An Economic Approach,” 9 Geo. Mason 
L.Rev. 1, 10 (2000); Lawrence Lessig, “The Law of the Horse: What 
Cyberlaw Might Teach,” 113 Harv. L.Rev. 501, 528 (1999). On the other 
hand, were a book reviewer to quote the entire book in his review, or so 
much of the book as to make the review a substitute for the book itself, he 
would be cutting into the publisher's market, and the defense of fair use 
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would fail. 
 
Generalizing from this example in economic terminology that has 
become orthodox in fair-use case law, we may say that copying that is 
complementary to the copyrighted work (in the sense that nails are 
complements of hammers) is fair use, but copying that is a substitute for the 
copyrighted work (in the sense that nails are substitutes for pegs or screws), 
or for derivative works from the copyrighted work…. If the price of nails 
fell, the demand for hammers would rise but the demand for pegs would 
fall. The hammer manufacturer wants there to be an abundant supply of 
cheap nails, and likewise publishers want their books reviewed and wouldn't 
want reviews inhibited and degraded by a rule requiring the reviewer to 
obtain a copyright license from the publisher if he wanted to quote from the 
book. So, in the absence of a fair-use doctrine, most publishers would 
disclaim control over the contents of reviews. The doctrine makes such 
disclaimers unnecessary. It thus economizes on transaction costs. 
 
The distinction between complementary and substitutional copying 
(sometimes-though as it seems to us, confusingly-said to be between 
“transformative” and “superseding” copies, see, e.g., Campbell v. Acuff-
Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994)) is illustrated not only by the 
difference between quotations from a book in a book review and the book 
itself, Marion B. Stewart, “Calculating Economic Damages in Intellectual 
Property Disputes: The Role of Market Definition,” 77 J. Patent & 
Trademark Office Society 321, 332 (1995), but also by the difference 
between parody (fair use) and burlesque (often not fair use). A parody, 
which is a form of criticism (good-natured or otherwise), is not intended as 
a substitute for the work parodied. But it must quote enough of that work to 
make the parody recognizable as such, and that amount of quotation is 
deemed fair use…. A burlesque, however, is often just a humorous 
substitute for the original and so cuts into the demand for it: one might 
choose to see Abbott and Costello Meet Frankenstein or Young 
Frankenstein rather than Frankenstein, or Love at First Bite rather than 
Dracula, or even Clueless rather than Emma. Burlesques of that character, 
catering to the humor-loving segment of the original's market, are not fair 
use….  The distinction is implicit in the proposition … that the parodist 
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must not take more from the original than is necessary to conjure it up and 
thus make clear to the audience that his work is indeed a parody. If he takes 
much more, he may begin to attract the audience away from the work 
parodied, not by convincing them that the work is no good (for that is not a 
substitution effect) but by providing a substitute for it. 
 
Book reviews and parodies are merely examples of types of work 
that quote or otherwise copy from copyrighted works yet constitute fair use 
because they are complements of (though sometimes negative 
complements, as in the case of a devastating book review) rather than 
substitutes for the copyrighted original. The commonest type is simply a 
quotation from a copyrighted work in a book or article on the same or a 
related subject. The complementary effect may be quite weak, but the 
quotation is unlikely to reduce the demand for the copyrighted work; nor 
could the copyright owner command a license fee commensurate with the 
costs of transacting with the copier. Such copying is therefore fair use. 
 
Were control of derivative works not part of a copyright owner's 
bundle of rights, it would be clear that PIL's books fell on the complement 
side of the divide and so were sheltered by the fair-use defense. A 
photograph of a Beanie Baby is not a substitute for a Beanie Baby. No one 
who wants a Beanie Baby, whether a young child who wants to play with it 
or an adult (or older child) who wants to collect Beanie Babies, would be 
tempted to substitute a photograph. But remember that photographs of 
Beanie Babies are conceded to be derivative works, for which there may be 
a separate demand that Ty may one day seek to exploit, and so someone 
who without a license from Ty sold photographs of Beanie Babies would be 
an infringer of Ty's sculpture copyrights. The complication here is that the 
photographs are embedded in text, in much the same way that quotations 
from a book are embedded in a review of the book. Ty regards the text that 
surrounds the photographs in PIL's Beanie Baby books as incidental; 
implicitly it compares the case to one in which a book reviewer quotes the 
whole book in his review. Or to a case in which a purveyor of pornographic 
pictures pastes a copy of the Declaration of Independence on the back of 
each picture and argues that judged as a whole his product has redeeming 
social value….  PIL argues, to the contrary, that the photographs are 
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indispensable to the creation of a collectors' guide to Beanie Babies; and, as 
we'll see shortly, collectors' guides are not derivative works. 
 
The proper characterization of PIL's Beanie Baby books is the kind 
of fact-laden issue appropriate for summary judgment only in extreme 
cases, which this case is not-in part because of differences among the books 
that the district court found infringed Ty's copyright. At one end of the 
spectrum is For the Love of Beanie Babies. This large-print book with hard 
shiny covers seems directed at a child audience. All the different Beanie 
Babies, more than 150 of them, are pictured. Each picture is accompanied 
by a brief commentary. Some of the commentary seems aimed exclusively 
at a child (or infantile adult) audience, such as the commentary on Snip the 
Siamese Cat: “That darn cat has nerve! Just like the real thing, Ty's Siamese 
has plenty of attitude. The champagne-colored cat with blue-ringed black 
eyes and chocolate-covered points is a beautiful specimen of the Far Eastern 
breed. And she knows it! Stretched out on all fours, this finicky feline is the 
only purebred in Ty's cathouse. This pretty kitty is definitely the cat's 
meow.” The commentary seems distinctly secondary to the photograph. An 
even clearer case is a two-page spread in For the Love of Beanie Babies 
entitled “Kitty Corner,” which we reproduce (without Ty's permission!-a 
good example of the fair-use doctrine in action) at the end of this opinion. 
The text is childish and pretty clearly secondary to the more than full-page 
photograph of feline Beanie Babies. Some of the commentary on 
photographs in For the Love of Beanie Babies does contain information 
relevant to collectors, such as “mint-condition Allys with older tags are very 
difficult to find. Retired.” (“Retired” means no longer being manufactured.) 
But For the Love of Beanie Babies might well be thought essentially just a 
collection of photographs of Beanie Babies, and photographs of Beanie 
Babies are derivative works from the copyrighted Beanie Babies 
themselves. 
 
At the opposite extreme is PIL's Beanie Babies Collector's Guide. 
This is a small paperback book with small print, clearly oriented toward 
adult purchasers-indeed, as the title indicates, toward collectors. Each page 
contains, besides a photograph of a Beanie Baby, the release date, the 
retired date, the estimated value of the Beanie Baby, and other information 
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relevant to a collector, such as that “Spooky is the only Beanie ever to have 
carried his designer's name,” or that “Prance should be a member of the 
Beanie line for some time, so don't panic and pay high secondary-market 
prices for her just because she's fairly new.” 
 
Some of the text is quite critical, for example accusing Ty of 
frequent trademark infringements. Ty doesn't like criticism, and so the 
copyright licenses that it grants to those publishers whom it is willing to 
allow to publish Beanie Baby collectors' guides reserve to it the right to veto 
any text in the publishers' guides. It also forbids its licensees to reveal that 
they are licensees of Ty. Its standard licensing agreement requires the 
licensee to print on the title page and back cover of its publication the 
following misleading statement: “This publication is not sponsored or 
endorsed by, or otherwise affiliated with Ty Inc. All Copyrights and 
Trademarks of Ty Inc. are used by permission. All rights reserved.” Notice 
the analogy to a publisher's attempting to use licensing to prevent critical 
reviews of its books-an attempt that the doctrine of fair use blocks. See 
Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., supra, 268 F.3d at 1277 
(concurring opinion). 
 
But we do need to explain the oddity of there being collectors' 
guides for a line of children's toys; otherwise it might seem clear that the 
Beanie Babies Collector's Guide was a device for circumventing Ty's lawful 
monopoly of derivative works. As a marketing gimmick, Ty deliberately 
creates a shortage in each Beanie Baby by selling it at a very low price and 
not producing enough copies to clear the market at that price. As a result, a 
secondary market is created, just like the secondary market in works of art. 
The secondary market gives widespread publicity to Beanie Babies, and the 
shortage that creates the secondary market stampedes children into nagging 
their parents to buy them the latest Beanie Babies, lest they be humiliated 
by not possessing the Beanie Babies that their peers possess. Ty, Inc. v. 
GMA Accessories, Inc., supra, 132 F.3d at 1171, 1173. The appeal is to the 
competitive conformity of children-but also to the mentality of collectors. 
 
When Beanie Babies Collector's Guide was published in 1998, some 
Beanie Babies were selling in the secondary market for thousands of 
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dollars, while others were selling for little more than their original purchase 
price. The range was vast, creating a demand for collectors' guides. Ty 
acknowledges as it must that a collectors' guide to a series of copyrighted 
works is no more a derivative work than a book review is. We cannot find a 
case on the point but the Copyright Act is clear. It defines a derivative work 
as “a work based upon one or more preexisting works, such as a translation, 
musical arrangement, dramatization, fictionalization, motion picture 
version, sound recording, art reproduction, abridgment, condensation, or 
any other form in which a work may be recast, transformed, or adapted.” 17 
U.S.C. § 101. A derivative work thus must either be in one of the forms 
named or be “recast, transformed, or adapted.”  The textual portions of a 
collectors' guide to copyrighted works are not among the examples of 
derivative works listed in the statute, and guides don't recast, transform, or 
adapt the things to which they are guides. A guide to Parisian restaurants is 
not a recasting, transforming, or adapting of Parisian restaurants. Indeed, a 
collectors' guide is very much like a book review, which is a guide to a 
book and which no one supposes is a derivative work. Both the book review 
and the collectors' guide are critical and evaluative as well as purely 
informational; and ownership of a copyright does not confer a legal right to 
control public evaluation of the copyrighted work. 
 
Ty's concession that a Beanie Babies collectors' guide is not a 
derivative work narrows the issue presented by PIL's appeal nicely (at least 
as to those books that are plausibly regarded as collectors' guides) to 
whether PIL copied more than it had to in order to produce a marketable 
collectors' guide. Ty points out that PIL's books copied (more precisely, 
made photographic copies of) the entire line of Beanie Babies, just like the 
book reviewer who copies the entire book. But the cases are clear that a 
complete copy is not per se an unfair use, see, e.g., Sony Corp. v. Universal 
City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 447-50; id. at 480 (dissenting opinion).., 
and the suggested analogy overlooks the fact that a collectors' guide, to 
compete in the marketplace, has to be comprehensive. Given that Ty can 
license (in fact has licensed) the publication of collectors' guides that 
contain photos of all the Beanie Babies, how could a competitor forbidden 
to publish photos of the complete line compete? And if it couldn't compete, 
the result would be to deliver into Ty's hands a monopoly of Beanie Baby 
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collectors' guides even though Ty acknowledges that such guides are not 
derivative works and do not become such by being licensed by it. Castle 
Rock Entertainment, Inc. v. Carol Publishing Group, Inc., 150 F.3d 132, 
145 n. 11 (2d Cir.1998) (“by developing or licensing a market for parody, 
news reporting, educational or other transformative uses of its own creative 
work, a copyright owner plainly cannot prevent others from entering those 
fair use markets”); see Sony Computer Entertainment, Inc. v. Connectix 
Corp., 203 F.3d 596, 607-08 (9th Cir.2000); Twin Peaks Productions, Inc. 
v. Publications Int'l, Ltd., 996 F.2d 1366, 1377 (2d Cir.1993) (“the author of 
‘Twin Peaks' cannot preserve for itself the entire field of publishable works 
that wish to cash in on the ‘Twin Peaks' phenomenon”). 
 
Granted, there is some question how, if Beanie Babies collectors' 
guides are indeed a complement to Beanie Babies (and they are), and Ty has 
a monopoly of Beanie Babies (and it does), Ty can get a second monopoly 
profit by taking over the guides market. The higher the price it charges for 
guides, the lower will be the demand for such guides and hence for 
collecting Beanie Babies and so the less effective will Ty's strategy of 
marketing Beanie Babies as collectibles be. This is the sort of question that 
has engendered skepticism among economists about the antitrust rule 
against tie-in agreements. But there is an answer here: Ty wants to suppress 
criticism of its product in these guides. 
 
Ty goes so far as to argue that PIL not only cannot publish photos of 
all the Beanie Babies but cannot publish color photos of any of them, and 
perhaps cannot publish black and white photos of any of them or even 
sketches but must instead be content with the name of the Beanie Baby and 
a verbal description. Such a guide would sink like a stone in the 
marketplace no matter how clever and informative its text, since Ty licenses 
publishers to publish photos of all the Beanie Babies in the licensees' 
collectors' guides. It would be like trying to compete with a CD of 
Beethoven's Fifth Symphony by selling the score. 
 
We have thus far discussed the application of the fair-use doctrine in 
terms of the purpose of the doctrine rather than its statutory definition, 
which though extensive is not illuminating. (More can be less, even in law.) 
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The statute provides that “the fair use of a copyrighted work ... for purposes 
such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching ... scholarship or 
research, is not an infringement of copyright.” 17 U.S.C. § 107. (Notice that 
the purposes listed are illustrative rather than comprehensive. Campbell v. 
Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., supra, 510 U.S. at 577-78.) In deciding whether a 
particular use is fair, the “factors to be considered shall include”-and notice 
again that the listing is illustrative rather than exhaustive; Congress 
“intended that courts continue the common law tradition of fair use 
adjudication” and section 107 “permits and requires courts to avoid rigid 
application of the copyright statute, when, on occasion, it would stifle the 
very creativity which that law is designed to foster,” -- (1) the purpose and 
character of the use, including whether such use is of a commercial nature 
or is for nonprofit educational purposes; (2) the nature of the copyrighted 
work; (3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the 
copyrighted work as a whole; and (4) the effect of the use upon the potential 
market for or value of the copyrighted work.” Factors (1) and (2) are empty, 
except that (1) suggests a preference for noncommercial educational uses, 
picking up the reference earlier in the statute to “teaching ... scholarship or 
research.” Factor (3) is inapplicable to Beanie Babies, each one of which is 
copyrighted separately, so that there can be no partial copying as a matter of 
fact (no one, we imagine, wants a photograph of part of a Beanie Baby). 
Factor (4) at least glances at the distinction we noted earlier between 
substitute and complementary copying, since the latter does not impair the 
potential market or value of the copyrighted work except insofar as it 
criticizes the work, which is the opposite of taking a free ride on its value. 
 
The important point is simply that, as the Supreme Court made clear 
not only in Campbell but also in Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios,  the 
four factors are a checklist of things to be considered rather than a formula 
for decision; and likewise the list of statutory purposes. … Because the 
factors and purposes are not exhaustive, Ty can get nowhere in defending 
the judgment by arguing that some or even all of them lean against the 
defense of fair use. The question is whether it would be unreasonable to 
conclude, with reference to one or more of the enjoined publications, such 
as the Beanie Babies Collector's Guide, that the use of the photos is a fair 
use because it is the only way to prepare a collectors' guide. 
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Ty relies primarily on two cases. Twin Peaks Productions, Inc. v. 
Publications International, Ltd., involved a book published by PIL 
concerning a television series. The book included a detailed recounting of 
the plot of the first eight episodes: “every intricate plot twist and element of 
character development appear in the Book in the same sequence as in the 
teleplays.”  The court held that the book was basically an abridgment of the 
script and that abridgments (despite contrary, aged authority) are generally 
not fair use.  The plot summaries were so extensive as to be substitutes for 
rather than complements of the copyrighted scripts. 
 
The other case on which Ty principally relies, Castle Rock 
Entertainment, Inc. v. Carol Publishing Group, Inc.,  involved another 
television series, Seinfeld, and another book, The Seinfeld Aptitude Test, a 
collection of trivia questions testing viewers' knowledge of obscure details 
of the series' plot and characters. There was evident complementarity: 
people who bought the book had to watch the show in order to pick up the 
answers to the questions in the book; no one would read the book in lieu of 
watching the show. When the book first appeared, the show's producers 
requested free copies and distributed them as promotional material, and the 
book's blurb told readers to “open this book to satisfy your between-episode 
cravings.” The court nevertheless held that the book wasn't insulated from 
copyright liability by the doctrine of fair use. The holding seems to rest in 
part, and very dubiously we must say, on the court's judgment that the book 
was frivolous.   “Undoubtedly, innumerable books could ‘expose’ the 
‘nothingness' or otherwise comment upon, criticize, educate the public 
about, or research Seinfeld and contemporary television culture. The 
[Seinfeld Aptitude Test], however, is not such a book.” But the fair-use 
doctrine is not intended to set up the courts as judges of the quality of 
expressive works.  That would be an unreasonable burden to place on 
judges, as well as raising a First Amendment question. 
 
But there was more to the court's decision. The Seinfeld Aptitude 
Test may have been a subterfuge for copying the script of the television 
series-and the script was a derivative work. The court said that “each ‘fact’ 
tested by The SAT is in reality fictitious expression created by Seinfeld's 
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authors. The SAT does not quiz such true facts as the identity of the actors 
in Seinfeld, the number of days it takes to shoot an episode, the biographies 
of the actors, the location of the Seinfeld set, etc. Rather, The SAT tests 
whether the reader knows that the character Jerry places a Pez dispenser on 
Elaine's leg during a piano recital, that Kramer enjoys going to the airport 
because he's hypnotized by the baggage carousels, and that Jerry, opining 
on how to identify a virgin, said ‘It's not like spotting a toupee.’ ” Castle 
Rock Entertainment, Inc. v. Carol Publishing Group, Inc., supra, 150 F.3d at 
139. A similar judgment might be possible here with regard to For the Love 
of Beanie Babies, which we described as basically just a picture book; and 
the pictures are derivative works from Ty's copyrighted soft sculptures. This 
raises the question whether, while summary judgment is plainly not 
warranted with regard to all the books that the district court found infringed 
Ty's copyrights, it might be warranted with regard to some of them, 
specifically For the Love of Beanie Babies. However, three reasons counsel 
against this course. The first is that the record actually contains not one but 
three versions of For the Love of Beanie Babies, and our earlier description 
was of the one furthest removed from a collectors' guide; the others are 
closer. Second, Ty is not asking us to consider the appropriateness of partial 
summary judgment. Third, and related to the second point, the briefs do not 
analyze the various books separately, making us reluctant to rule separately 
on them. We do not preclude consideration on remand of the possibility of 
partial summary judgment….. 
 
REVERSED AND REMANDED. 
 
NOTES AND QUESTIONS 
 
1. In his Ty, Inc. opinion, Judge Posner states “The defense of fair use, 
originally judge-made, now codified, plays an essential role in copyright 
law. Without it, any copying of copyrighted material would be a 
copyright infringement.” The Copyright Act provides that “the fair use 
of a copyrighted work . . . for purposes such as criticism, comment, 
news reporting, teaching . . . scholarship or research, is not an 
infringement of copyright.” 17 U.S.C. § 107.  The statute also outlines 
four factors when considering fair use: (1) the purpose and character of 
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the use, including whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for 
nonprofit educational purposes; (2) the nature of the copyrighted work; 
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the 
copyrighted work as a whole; and (4) the effect of the use upon the 
potential market for or value of the copyrighted work.” Id.   
 
2. Derivative Works – Complements vs. Substitutes. The 
Copyright Act defines a derivative work as “a work based upon one or 
more preexisting works, such as a translation, musical arrangement, 
dramatization, fictionalization, motion picture version, sound recording, 
art reproduction, abridgment, condensation, or any other form in which 
a work may be recast, transformed, or adapted.” 17 U.S.C. § 101.  
Derivative works can frequently be divided into two categories: 
complements and substitutes. Complement works seek to enhance a 
copyrighted work, and are often defended using the fair use doctrine.  
However, substitute works are often infringing, as they seek to replace a 
current copyrighted work and therefore cause direct harm to the plaintiff 
in an infringement suit.  Needless to say, complementary works are fair 
use, as the “effect of the use upon the potential market” is unlikely to 
decrease demand for the copyrighted work.  However, since a substitute 
work is meant to encroach on the market created by the copyrighted 
work and take away from potential profits, it is almost always 
infringement. 
 
3. Parody. For the purposes of copyright law, parody is “the use of some 
elements of a prior author's composition to create a new one that, at 
least in part, comments on that author's works.” Campbell v. Acuff-Rose 
Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 580 (1994). As Judge Posner identifies in his 
Ty, Inc. opinion, a parody is not meant to substitute for the original 
work, but is a form a criticism that requires a certain amount of 
quotation in order to get its point across.  Therefore, parody is often a 
“fair use” of copyrighted material. 
 
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., is the best known parody 
copyright incringement case.  In 1964, Roy Orbison released the hit 
song “Oh, Pretty Woman.”  The song is probably best known, however, 
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as the theme song for the 1990 hit movie Pretty Woman, starring Julia 
Roberts and Richard Gere.  In 1989, 2 Live Crew, a popular rap group, 
released a bawdy parody of Orbison’s hit single.  The parody opened to 
the now-famous bass line of “Oh, Pretty Woman” but then progressed to 
lyrics that were crass and offensive.  Acuff-Rose Music, who owned the 
rights to Orbison’s work, filed an infringement suit.  The U.S. Supreme 
Court began its discussion of the case by stating “It is uncontested here 
that 2 Live Crew's song would be an infringement of Acuff-Rose's 
rights in ‘Oh, Pretty Woman,’ under the Copyright Act of 1976, but for 
a finding of fair use through parody.” Id. at 574.  The Court found 
compelling reasons for protecting parody from claims of copyright 
infringement, concluded that 2 Live Crew’s song may very well be a 
parody and remanded the decision to the Circuit Court.  
 
GARRETSON V. CLARK 
111 U.S. 120 (1884) 
 
FIELD, J. 
 
The patent was for an improvement in the construction of mop-heads, 
which may be described, with sufficient accuracy, as an improvement in the 
method of moving and securing in place the movable jam or clamp of a 
mop-head. With the exception of this mode of clamping, mop-heads like the 
plaintiff's had been in use time out of mind. Before the master, the plaintiff 
proved the cost of his mop-heads, and the price at which they were sold, 
and claimed the right to recover the difference as his damages. This rule 
was rejected…. 
 
 When a patent is for an improvement, and not for an entirely new 
machine or contrivance, the patentee must show in what particulars his 
improvement has added to the usefulness of the machine or contrivance. He 
must separate its results distinctly from those of the other parts, so that the 
benefits derived from it may be distinctly seen and appreciated. The rule on 
this head is aptly stated by Mr. Justice BLATCHFORD in the court below: 
‘The patentee,’ he says, ‘must in every case give evidence tending to 
separate or apportion the defendant's profits and the patentee's damages 
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between the patented feature and the unpatented features, and such evidence 
must be reliable and tangible, and not conjectural or speculative; or he must 
show, by equally reliable and satisfactory evidence, that the profits and 
damages are to be calculated on the whole machine, for the reason that the 
entire value of the whole machine, as a marketable article, is properly and 
legally attributable to the patented feature.’ The plaintiff complied with 
neither part of this rule. He produced no evidence to apportion the profits or 
damages between the improvement constituting the patented feature and the 
other features of the mop. His evidence went only to show the cost of the 
whole mop, and the price at which it was sold. And, of course, it could not 
be pretended that the entire value of the mop-head was attributable to the 
feature patented. So the whole case ended, the rule was not followed, and 
the decree is therefore affirmed. 
 
NOTES AND QUESTIONS 
 
1. Section 101 of the Patent Act states that “Whoever invents or discovers . 
. . any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent 
therefore, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title.”  35 
U.S.C. 101.  Not only does the patent act provide for patents on new 
inventions, but also improvements on old inventions. However, not all 
improvements are patentable.  In order to pass the nonobvious 
requirement of patents, the patentee must prove that the invention is not 
obvious to a person having ordinary skill in the art (“PHOSITA”), and 
not whether it is an improvement over the prior art.  35 U.S.C. § 103(a).  
In his opinion above, Justice Field enforces the purpose of the patent act 
by stating that in order to obtain a patent, the patentee must show “in 
what particulars his improvement has added to the usefulness of the 
machine” and that the “benefits derived from [the improvement] may be 
distinctly seen and appreciated.”  How should licensing come into play 
in these cases?  How innovative does an improvement have to be to 
obtain a patent?   
 
2. The problem of After-Arising Technology.  When filing a patent 
application, inventors sometimes seek to patent the invention as well as 
all uses/improvements on the patent that the inventor could have 
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reasonable foreseen.  As long as the inventor discloses the embodiments 
of his invention under § 112 of the Patent Act, he will generally be 
given the exclusive rights over later uses of his invention that use “after-
arising” technologytechnology not known at the time the patent is 
filed.   See Mark A. Lemley, et al, Life After Bilski, 63 Stanford L. Rev. 
1315 (2011).  Is this fair to inventors in general?  Should patents cover 
after-arising technology whether or not they were foreseeable, or would 
including such after-arising technology stifle innovation rather than 
protect it?  See Chiron Corp. v. Genentech, Inc., 363 F.3d 1247 (Fed. 
Cir. 2004). 
 
3.  Proving Damages.  Section 284 of the Patent Act provides, “Upon 
finding for the claimant the court shall award the claimant damages 
adequate to compensate for the infringement, but in no event less than a 
reasonable royalty for the use made of the invention by the infringer, 
together with interest and costs as fixed by the court.”  35 U.S.C. § 284 
(2010).   
 
In determining the amount of damages to which a patentee may 
be entitled, Judge Field reiterates the conclusions of the lower court, 
stating, “The patentee . . . must in every case give evidence tending to 
separate or apportion the defendant's profits and the patentee's damages 
between the patented feature and the unpatented features, and such 
evidence must be reliable and tangible.” However, in order to prove 
damages, the patentee has to show not only that the defendant captured 
sales from infringing on the patent, but that he actually captured them 
from the patentee herself. 
 
Cf.  Mosler Safe Co. v. Ely-Norris Safe Co. 273 U.S. 132 
(1926), a common law case involving the tort of “palming off,” an 
antecedent of trademark infringement.   Mosler was a safe company that 
held a patent on safes with interior explosive chambers that would jam a 
deadbolt into the frame when the safe detected tampering.  A brass strip 
around the outside of the safe indicated the chamber and served as a 
trademark.  Ely-Norris, another safe company, began to make safes that 
looked nearly identical to Mosler’s safes.  The defendant’s safes bore 
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the metal strip but lacked the exploding chamber.  Mosler sued for 
palming off, a form of trademark infringement, and sought damages for 
lost profits. 
 
However, Ely-Norris was able to present evidence that Mosler 
was not the only safe manufacturing company that made safes with 
exploding chambers. Justice Holmes’s opinion for the Supreme Court 
observed that because several competitors manufactured similar safes 
Mosler could not prove that sales made by Ely-Norris had actually been 
stolen from Mosler.  As a result Mosler could not prove lost profits. 
 
IP INNOVATION, LLC v. RED HAT, Inc. 
705 F.Supp.2d 687 (E.D.Tex. 2010) 
 
RADER, Judge. 
 
Defendants Red Hat, Inc. and Novell, Inc. seek to exclude the 
testimony and strike the expert report of Mr. Joseph Gemini.  Mr. Gemini is 
Plaintiffs IP Innovation L.L.C. and Technology Licensing Corp.'s (“IPI”) 
expert on reasonably royalty damages. This court GRANTS-IN-PART and 
DENIES-IN-PART the motion. 
 
 Under Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, a court may 
permit opinion testimony from an expert only if such testimony “will assist 
the trier of fact” and “(1) the testimony is based upon sufficient facts or 
data, (2) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods, and 
(3) the witness has applied the principles and methods reliably to the facts 
of the case.” The district courts act as gatekeepers tasked with the inquiry 
into whether expert testimony is “not only relevant, but reliable.” Daubert v. 
Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 589 (1993). This court must 
exclude testimony that does not meet the requirements of Rule 702. 
 
  In a suit for patent infringement, a successful plaintiff is entitled to 
“damages adequate to compensate for the infringement, but in no event less 
than a reasonable royalty for the use made of the invention by the infringer, 
together with interest and costs as fixed by the court.” 35 U.S.C. § 284 
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(2006). The statute authorizes two categories of infringement compensation: 
lost profits and reasonably royalty damages. Lucent Techs., Inc. v. 
Gateway, Inc., 580 F.3d 1301, 1324 (Fed.Cir.2009). Because IPI does not 
manufacture or sell products incorporating the patents-in-suit, it has not 
sought, and is not entitled to, lost profits. 
 
 A reasonable royalty contemplates a hypothetical negotiation 
between the patentee and the infringer at a time before the infringement 
began. Hanson v. Alpine Valley Ski Area, Inc., 718 F.2d 1075, 1078 
(Fed.Cir.1983). Critically, the hypothetical negotiation presumes that the 
patentee is a willing licensor and the alleged infringer is a willing licensee, 
with both parties assuming the patent was valid, enforceable, and infringed. 
Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. U.S. Plywood Corp., 318 F.Supp. 1116, 1120 
(S.D.N.Y.1970). The Federal Circuit “requires sound economic proof of the 
nature of the market and likely outcomes with infringement factored out of 
the economic picture” in all damages calculations. Grain Processing Corp. 
v. Am. Maize-Prods. Co., 185 F.3d 1341, 1350 (Fed.Cir.1999). Although 
some approximation is permitted in calculating the reasonable royalty, the 
Federal Circuit requires “sound economic and factual predicates” for that 
analysis. Riles v. Shell Exploration & Production Co., 298 F.3d 1302, 1311 
(Fed.Cir.2002) (citation omitted). Where, as here, such sound economic and 
factual predicates are absent from a reasonable royalty analysis, Rule 702 
requires this court to exclude that unreliable proffered evidence. 
 
  A reliable reasonable royalty calculation depends on trustworthy 
evidence of both the royalty base and the royalty rate. Mr. Gemini invoked 
the “entire market value rule” in identifying the royalty base in this case. 
Under the entire market value rule, damages are recoverable only “if the 
patented apparatus was of such paramount importance that it substantially 
created the value of the component parts.” Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co., 
Inc., 56 F.3d 1538, 1549 (Fed.Cir.1995) (citation omitted). Therefore, “the 
patentee must prove that the patent-related feature is the basis for customer 
demand.” Lucent, 580 F.3d at 1336. 
 
In this case, IPI has accused Red Hat's and Novell's Linux-based 
operating systems of infringing the patents-in-suit, including the Enterprise 
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Linux Desktop and Server products. IPI alleges that the operating systems' 
multiple virtual workspaces and workspace switching features infringe the 
patents-in-suit. In invoking the “entire market value rule,” Mr. Gemini 
included 100% of Red Hat's and Novell's total revenues from sales of 
subscriptions to the accused operating systems in his proposed royalty base. 
Mr. Gemini's methodology however does not show a sound economic 
connection between the claimed invention and this broad proffered royalty 
base. 
 
The claimed invention is but one relatively small component of the 
accused operating systems. The evidence shows that the workspace 
switching feature represents only one of over a thousand components 
included in the accused products. Mr. Gemini relies on an online user forum 
for a third-party product to show that some users tout a desktop switching 
feature as essential. However, selected users' statements in isolation and 
without a relationship to the actual claimed technology do not show an 
accurate economic measurement of total market demand for the switching 
feature, let alone its contribution to the demand for the entire product 
asserted as the royalty base. The workspace switching feature's small role in 
the overall product is further confirmed when one considers the relative 
importance of certain other features such as security, interoperability, and 
virtualization. Moreover this proffered evidence has no economic 
foundation. 
 
Contrary to the proffer of Mr. Gemini, the record-even at this 
pretrial stage after discovery-suggests that users do not buy the accused 
operating systems for their workspace switching feature. Most of Red Hat's 
and Novell's accused sales come from their Server products, the majority of 
which are not connected to a display and thus do not take advantage of the 
workspace switching feature. Mr. Gemini made no effort to factor out of his 
proffered royalty base these products which do not even feature the claimed 
invention. Once again, this blatant oversight shows that Mr. Gemini did not 
use the type of reliable economic principles and methods required by Rule 
702 for an economic damages expert. Also, the record shows that some 
accused operating systems are sold to the public with a default setting that 
does not enable the workspace switching feature. Mr. Gemini made no 
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effort to factor out of his proffered royalty base those operating systems in 
which the user never affirmatively enables the claimed switching feature. In 
fact, he made no effort to even discern the percentage of users who would 
never enable or use the claimed feature. This aspect of his questionable 
methodology also shows inattention to the economic and factual data 
necessary for a reliable assessment of a compensatory royalty. Overall, Mr. 
Gemini never accounts for the record evidence that most users of the 
accused operating systems do not seem to use the workspace switching 
feature at all. Accordingly, the record cannot support the unfounded 
conclusion that the often-unused feature drives demand for a royalty base of 
100% of the operating systems as a whole. In sum, this stunning 
methodological oversight makes it very difficult for this court to give any 
credibility to Mr. Gemini's assertion that the claimed feature is the “basis 
for customer demand.” 
 
IPI tries to shift the burden to Red Hat and Novell, complaining that 
they did not provide sufficient information for Mr. Gemini to determine the 
value of the desktop switching feature relative to other features of the 
accused products. IPI argues that the defendants' desktop switching feature 
has no separate valuation, no aftermarket, and thus no way to value the 
accused feature separately. This court, however, must insist under the law 
that IPI, not Red Hat or Novell, has the burden of proving damages by a 
preponderance of evidence.  IPI cannot blame the defendants for Mr. 
Gemini's assertion of 100% of the revenue as royalty base. IPI must show 
some plausible economic connection between the invented feature and the 
accused operating systems before using the market value of the entire 
product as the royalty base. 
 
Another reason for excluding Mr. Gemini's expert testimony is that 
he arbitrarily picked a royalty rate that is much higher than the existing 
royalty rates for licenses to the patents-in-suit. As a “starting point” for 
determining the royalty rate, Mr. Gemini used a 2004 publication titled 
“Licensing Economics Review” (“LER”) by AUE Consultants and a 2004 
study by Navigant Consulting. LER indicated that the average royalty rate 
for the Software industry was 11.6% of revenues with a median of 7.5 % of 
revenues. Navigant Consulting's study indicated that for Computer and 
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Electronic Products Manufacturing industry, royalty rates were at a high of 
40.0%, a low of 1.0%, a mean of 10.2%, and median of 6.0% of revenues. 
However, “software industry” and “computer and electronic products 
manufacturing industry” encompass much more than the desktop switching 
feature at issue in this case. Mr. Gemini offers no evidence that the alleged 
industry agreements are in any way comparable to the patents-in-suit. See 
ResQNet.com, Inc. v. Lansa, Inc., 594 F.3d 860, 869-71 (Fed.Cir.2010) 
(discrediting license agreements because “none of these licenses even 
mentioned the patents in suit or showed any other discernible link to the 
claimed technology”). 
 
 Instead of relying on these studies, Mr. Gemini should have at least 
inaugurated his analysis with reference to the existing licenses to the 
patents-in-suit. See Georgia-Pacific, 318 F.Supp. at 1120 (considering past 
and present royalties received by the patentee “for the licensing of the 
patent-in-suit, proving or tending to prove an established royalty”). “An 
established royalty is usually the best measure of a ‘reasonable’ royalty for 
a given use of an invention because it removes the need to guess at the 
terms to which parties would hypothetically agree.” Monsanto Co. v. 
McFarling, 488 F.3d 973, 978-79 (Fed.Cir.2007) (citation omitted). The 
previous owner of the patents-in-suit, Xerox Corporation, entered into 
several license agreements that involved one or more of the patents-in-suit. 
At least two of these agreements were entered into outside of the context of 
litigation and thus appropriate as touchstones for determining the 
appropriate royalty rate in this case. Mr. Gemini disregarded these licenses 
because Xerox entered into these agreements in the mid-1990's, a decade 
before the alleged hypothetical negotiation date. However, these licenses 
are far more relevant than the general market studies on which Mr. Gemini 
primarily relied in his expert report. A credible economic approach might 
have tried to account for the passage of time since the 1990's agreements on 
the patents in this case, rather than reject them out of hand. 
 
Accordingly, Mr. Gemini's current expert report improperly inflates 
both the royalty base and the royalty rate by relying on irrelevant or 
unreliable evidence and by failing to account for the economic realities of 
this claimed component as part of a larger system. This court hereby 
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precludes Mr. Gemini from testifying at the trial of this case or otherwise 
presenting his opinions on the issue of damages based on his current expert 
report. Given the lack of evidence in the record relating to damages, this 
court will entertain appropriate motions to repair and prepare a record 
suitable for trial on the issue of damages. This court will entertain 
appropriate motions and responses on the topic of damages. The parties are 
reminded that expert testimony on the topic of damages will not be allowed 
absent a firm basis in accepted economic principles with an eye to the facts 
of this record. 
 
It is SO ORDERED.  
 
RICOH CO., LTD. V. QUANTA COMPUTER, INC. 
2010 WL 1607908 (W.D.Wis.,2010) 
 
 CRABB, District Judge. 
 
  A jury found that defendants Quanta Computer, Inc. and Quanta 
Storage, Inc. indirectly infringed two patents related to optical disc drives 
owned by plaintiff Ricoh Company, Ltd., U.S. Patent No. 
5,063,552 and U.S. Patent No. 6, 661,755…. Now before the court is 
plaintiff's motion for a permanent injunction…   Because I conclude that 
plaintiff cannot satisfy the four-factor test for obtaining a permanent 
injunction set out in eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 
(2006), I am denying plaintiff's request for a permanent injunction. In 
accordance with Paise LLC v. Toyota Motor Corp., 504 F.3d 1293, 1315 
(Fed.Cir.2007), the parties will be directed to “negotiate a license amongst 
themselves regarding future use” of the 755 patent. 
 
 In eBay, the Supreme Court rejected the view that, in patent cases, 
“injunctions should be denied only in the unusual case, under exceptional 
circumstances and in rare instances ... to protect the public interest.”  
Rather, the same standard for obtaining a permanent injunction applies in 
patent cases as in any other case. The plaintiff must show that (1) it has 
suffered an irreparable injury; (2) the remedies available at law are 
inadequate to compensate for that injury; (3) considering the balance of 
hardships between the plaintiff and defendant, a remedy in equity is 
warranted; and (4) the public interest would not be disserved by a 
permanent injunction. 
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 In this case, there are few reasons to grant a permanent injunction 
and many that counsel against doing so. To begin with, it is undisputed that 
plaintiff does not practice the invention in the 755 patent. In fact, plaintiff 
no longer manufactures or sells any disc drives. The best case for obtaining 
a permanent injunction often occurs when the plaintiff and defendant are 
competing in the same market. In that context, the harm in allowing the 
defendant to continue infringing is the greatest.   Because plaintiff is not 
competing with defendants for the same customers, it is more difficult for 
plaintiff to argue that it will be irreparably harmed without an injunction. 
 
 Plaintiff is correct that it is possible for a non-practicing entity to 
satisfy the four-factor test. “For example, some patent holders, such as 
university researchers or self-made inventors, might reasonably prefer to 
license their patents, rather than undertake efforts to secure the financing 
necessary to bring their works to market themselves.” eBay, 547 U.S. at 
393. Of course, plaintiff is not a researcher or a self-made inventor. Rather, 
plaintiff may be more akin to an entity that four Justices concluded in their 
concurrence generally is not entitled to a permanent injunction: 
 
 An industry has developed in which firms use patents not as 
a basis for producing and selling goods but, instead, primarily for 
obtaining licensing fees. For these firms, an injunction, and the 
potentially serious sanctions arising from its violation, can be 
employed as a bargaining tool to charge exorbitant fees to 
companies that seek to buy licenses to practice the patent. When the 
patented invention is but a small component of the product the 
companies seek to produce and the threat of an injunction is 
employed simply for undue leverage in negotiations, legal damages 
may well be sufficient to compensate for the infringement and an 
injunction may not serve the public interest. 
 
eBay, 547 U.S. at 396-97 (Kennedy, J., concurring with Stevens, J., Souter. 
J., and Breyer, J.) 
 
 As defendants point out, plaintiff has not been miserly in issuing 
licenses for the 755 patent for any company willing to pay for one. 
Plaintiff's own witnesses testified at trial that plaintiff has issued licenses to 
Sony, Hitachi, Toshiba, Matsushita, Panasonic, Lite-On, BenQ, Pioneer, 
Phillips and IBM.   Plaintiff even issued a license to ASUS after that 
company was dismissed from this case for lack of personal jurisdiction. In 
fact, plaintiff does not identify any sellers of optical disc drives other than 
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defendants that have not yet taken a license. Thus, plaintiff cannot argue 
persuasively that it is trying to narrowly limit the practice of its invention 
rather than simply maximize a potential licensing fee. Also, as in the 
hypothetical situation discussed by Justice Kennedy, plaintiff's patent “is 
but a small component of the product [defendants] seek to produce,” which 
is another factor suggesting that “legal damages may well be sufficient to 
compensate for the infringement and an injunction may not serve the public 
interest.” eBay. 
 
 Plaintiff says that defendants' “competitors will be encouraged to 
infringe the '755 patent” and that plaintiff's “entire licensing program 
worldwide will suffer because other manufacturers will be tempted to roll 
the dice and infringe [plaintiff's] patents” if plaintiff does not obtain an 
injunction.   The first part of this argument assumes that there are any 
competitors left who do not have a license already. Further, with respect to 
both arguments, plaintiff fails to point to any evidence showing that an 
injunction would have a greater deterrent effect than a compulsory license. 
Plaintiff says that, absent a threat of an injunction, infringers would have 
nothing to lose by forcing plaintiff to sue them, but this overlooks the cost 
of litigation as well as the possibility of a finding of willful infringement 
and an award of attorney fees for asserting a frivolous position. Even if I 
assumed that injunctions generally have a greater deterrent effect, plaintiff 
fails to explain why that factor weighs more heavily in this case than in any 
other case in which a court must determine whether a permanent injunction 
is appropriate. The logical conclusion of plaintiff's argument is to return to 
the view rejected by the Court in eBay that plaintiffs in patent cases are 
entitled to a permanent injunction as a matter of course because injunctions 
always serve as a better deterrent than an ongoing royalty. 
 
  The balance of harms does not weigh heavily in either direction, but 
overall I believe that factor favors defendants. Both sides have taken 
varying positions regarding the feasibility of designing around the 755 
patent, depending on which position serves a particular argument. However, 
even if the invention in the 755 patent is not the only way to perform buffer 
underrun protection, implementing a new design is complicated by the fact 
that defendants do not manufacture the infringing component in the drives. 
Thus, defendants would have to convince the manufacturer to come up with 
a noninfringing alternative or alter the component themselves after 
purchasing it from the manufacturer. Plaintiff has not shown that either of 
these possibilities is realistic. 
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  Alternatively, plaintiff argues that defendants could limit their sales 
of drives to companies that have licenses or “sell drives destined for 
countries other than the United States.” However, neither of these options 
makes much sense. Restricting defendants' sales to particular companies 
benefits neither plaintiff nor defendants, but simply funnels defendants' 
business toward third parties. With respect to the other option, plaintiff fails 
to explain how defendants would be able to predict or control which 
country a disc drive was “destined” for when they sell drives to companies 
such as Dell or Gateway. 
 
  With respect to the question whether plaintiff has adequate legal 
remedies, plaintiff argues that calculating an ongoing reasonable royalty 
rate is not feasible in this case because defendant “Quanta Storage does not 
track its total sales in the United States.” That argument is undermined by 
the trial in this case, in which plaintiff seemed to have little difficulty 
proposing a reasonable royalty rate to the jury for past infringement. 
 
 Certainly, the difficulty of calculating a reasonable royalty rate is no 
greater than crafting an appropriate injunction and then enforcing it. The 
jury did not find that defendants made or sold any infringing products in the 
United States, only that defendants contributed to infringement by others or 
actively induced it. Thus, crafting an appropriate injunction is not as simple 
as listing particular products that defendants may not sell in the United 
States; rather, it would require prohibiting defendants from engaging in 
particular acts that might constitute indirect infringement. Plaintiff's 
proposed injunction states generally that defendants are prohibited from 
“selling in the United States-directly or indirectly-offering for sale or 
importing into the United States, or otherwise inducing or encouraging use 
of [infringing] drives in the United States.” That language is so vague that it 
likely would violate the specificity requirements of Fed.R.Civ.P. 65. Nuxoll 
ex rel. Nuxoll v. Indian Prairie School Dist. # 204, 523 F.3d 668, 675 (7th 
Cir.2008) (“[A]n injunction ... must contain a detailed and specific 
statement of its terms.”); Patriot Homes, Inc. v. Forest River Housing, 
Inc., 512 F.3d 412, 415 (7th Cir.2008) (“The preliminary injunction entered 
by the district court uses a collection of verbs to prohibit [the defendant] 
from engaging in certain conduct, but ultimately it fails to detail what the 
conduct is.”). Monitoring and enforcing the injunction would be even more 
difficult because it would require plaintiff to determine when defendants 
were “encouraging” or “inducing” infringement and also when a third party 
was engaging in acts of direct infringement. Plaintiff does not identify how 
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this could be accomplished without repeated trips to this court for 
evidentiary hearings. 
 
  Finally, plaintiff has failed to show that the public interest would be 
better served through an injunction rather than a compulsory license. 
Plaintiff argues that the “Constitutional goal of promoting science” under 
Article I, § 8 favors an injunction.  Again, plaintiff fails to identify any facts 
in this case that would help serve that purpose more than with respect to any 
other claim for patent infringement. In fact, plaintiff has not shown that an 
injunction would serve any purpose other than to increase its leverage in 
negotiations for a higher licensing fee. Because that is not an adequate 
ground for an injunction, plaintiff's motion for a permanent injunction will 
be denied. 
 
   In many cases, if an injunction is not appropriate, the plaintiff may be 
entitled to an ongoing royalty….  [T]he general rule is “to allow the parties 
to negotiate a license amongst themselves regarding future use of a patented 
invention before imposing an ongoing royalty. Should the parties fail to 
come to an agreement, the district court [may] step in to assess a reasonable 
royalty in light of the ongoing infringement.”   Accordingly, I will direct the 
parties to engage in negotiations regarding an appropriate royalty. 
 
NOTES AND QUESTIONS 
 
1.  The Patent Act provides that an infringed patentee is entitled damages 
adequate to compensate for infringement. In such a case, there are three 
types of remedies a patentee may seek: (1) a reasonable royalty, (2) lost 
profits, and (3) an injunction. In determining the type and amount of 
damages, a court must ask “had the Infringer not infringed, what would the 
Patent Holder have made?” Lucent Techs., Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., 580 F.3d 
1301, 1324 (Fed.Cir.2009).  A reasonable royalty and lost profits are paid 
out in a monetary sum to the patentee, while an injunction simply forces the 
infringer to cease from all operations constituting infringement. 
 
2.  “A reasonable royalty is, of course, merely the floor below which 
damages shall not fall.”  Lucent Techs., Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., 580 F.3d 
1301, 1324 (Fed.Cir.2009). There are two approaches for calculating a 
reasonable royalty.  The first is an analytical method, which involves 
“subtracting the infringer's usual or acceptable net profit from its anticipated 
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net profit realized from sales of infringing devices.” TWM Mfg. Co. v. 
Dura Corp., 789 F.2d 895, 899 (Fed.Cir.1986). The second, which is more 
common, is the hypothetical negotiation or the “willing licensor-willing 
licensee” approach.  This method attempts to determine the royalty upon 
which the parties would have agreed had they successfully negotiated an 
agreement before infringement began. See Lucent Techs, 580 F.3d at 1324.   
See also Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. U.S. Plywood Corp., 318 F.Supp. 1116 
(S.D.N.Y. 1970) (listing fifteen criteria fact-finders consider in determining 
what amounts to a reasonable royalty). 
 
“Lost profits may be in the form of diverted sales, eroded prices, or 
increased expenses. The patent owner must establish a causation between 
his lost profits and the infringement. A factual basis for the causation is that 
“but for” the infringement, the patent owner would have made the sales that 
the infringer made, charged higher prices, or incurred lower expenses.”  
Lam, Inc. v. Johns-Manville Corp. 718 F.2d 1056 (1983).  In claiming for 
lost profits, the patentee is not required to prove an absolute profit, but only 
a reasonable probability of profits. Id.  However, the patentee must make 
effort to prove that he specfically lost profits, otherwise all the patentee may 
be able to recover is a reasonable royalty. Georgia-Pacific, 318 F.Supp. at 
1129. 
 
See also LaserDynamics, Inc. v. Quanta Computer, Inc., 694 F.3d 51 
(Fed. Cir. 2012), in which the court held that an expert could not base the 
patentee's damages on a percentage of the value of an entire laptop 
computer when the patent in question was on a device that enabled the 
optical drive to determine what type of disc had been inserted.  How much 
does it matter what the base is, as long as the royalty percentage is adjusted 
accordingly?  The court remanded for a determining of a hypothetically 
negotiated reasonable royalty. 
 
3.  When a patent owner cannot show lost profits, which is the norm 
in markets that contain numerous patents and competitively structure 
markets, patent damages are often based on a hypothetical royalty 
negotiation.  What royalty would the parties have negotiated had they done 
so ex ante?  An important principle in such negotiations is opportunity cost, 
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or the idea that a buyer will not pay more for a license than for an equally 
good alternative.  For example, if equally good technology was available 
from an alternative seller who charges a $1.00 royalty to all takers, then the 
disputed patent is probably not worth more than $1.00 either.  Or if a patent 
enables a firm to use $2.00 worth of a particular input rather than $2.30, and 
makes no other contribution, then the license to the patent cannot be worth 
more than the 30 cents cost savings.  See Grain Processing Corp. v. 
American Maize-Products, 185 F.3d 1341 (Fed. Cir 1999).  Alternatively, if 
the defendant could have "invented around" the patent at a fairly modest 
cost, then the value that the patent adds to the infringer's product cannot be 
more than that cost.  Of course, in such cases the alternative may not be 
"equally good," and then adjustments will have to be made.  See Apple, Inc. 
v. Motorola, Inc., 2012 WL 1959560 (N.D.Ill. May 22, 2012) (rejecting 
such evidence when it came from interested parties, one of whom was not 
competent to testify, but then also rejecting plaintiff's expert testimony for 
failure to consider reasonably available alternatives).  See also 
Spectralytics, Inc. v. Cordis Corp., 649 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2011) 
(rejecting cost of an available alternative as a royalty cap when the evidence 
showed that the alternative had been tried and was found to be inferior). 
 
4.  In eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC 547 U.S. 388 (2006), 
MercExchange held a patent designed to facilitate the sale of goods among 
private individuals.  MercExchange sought license its patent to eBay.  
However, the parties failed to reach an agreement.  Subsequently, 
MercExchange filed an patent infringement case against eBay.  At the 
District Court, a jury found eBay had in fact infringed MercExchange’s 
patent and awarded damages.  As a remedy, MercExchange sought a 
permanent injunction. 
 
 In determining whether MercExchange was entitled to 
injunctive relief, the Supreme Court found that, as in courts of equity, a 
plaintiff seeking permanent injunctive must satisfy a four-factor test and 
demonstrate: (1) that it has suffered an irreparable injury; (2) that 
remedies available at law, such as monetary damages, are inadequate to 
compensate for that injury; (3) that, considering the balance of hardships 
between the plaintiff and defendant, a remedy in equity is warranted; 
INNOVATION AND COMPETITION POLICY                                Chapter 3, Page  41 
Hovenkamp                                                                                           Jan., 2013 
 
and (4) that the public interest would not be disserved by a permanent 
injunction. 
 
 Writing for the majority, Justice Thomas held, “This approach is 
consistent with our treatment of injunctions under the Copyright Act. 
Like a patent owner, a copyright holder possesses the right to exclude 
others from using his property. Like the Patent Act, the Copyright Act 
provides that courts may grant injunctive relief on such terms as it may 
deem reasonable to prevent or restrain infringement of a copyright. And 
as in our decision today, this Court has consistently rejected invitations 
to replace traditional equitable considerations with a rule that an 
injunction automatically follows a determination that a copyright has 
been infringed.” 
 
Since eBay, the overwhelming trend among the lower courts has been 
to deny injunctions to non-practicing entities, sometimes referred to as 
patent “trolls.”  The Ricoh decision is a good example. 
 
5. Should a patentee's remedy depend on its market share?  In general, 
dominant firms can more easily prove damages because they are able to 
show that sales were taken from them.  This is often not the case for a firm 
in a highly competitive market, where sales could have come from 
anywhere.  Likewise, the "reasonable royalty" that a monopolist might 
negotiate could be considerably higher than the one negotiated by one of 
many patentees in the market for that particular innovation.  Should a firm 
with a very high market share should have a greater entitlement to an 
injunction?  If patent remedy rules tend to favor dominant firms, doesn't this 
put patent law on a collision course with antitrust, which favors the 
preservation of competition?  If the purpose of antitrust remedies is to 
promote competition, shouldn't the purpose of patent remedies be to spur 
innovation? 
 
